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ABSTRACT. Does epistemology collapse for lack of resources other than logic, conceptual analysis
and descriptions of one’s own apparent experiences, thoughts and beliefs? No, but understanding
how and why not requires, Kant noted, a ‘changed method of thinking’ (veränderte Methode der
Denkungsart; KdrV Bxvii, 704). Some of these methodological changes are summarised in §2 in
order to identify a philosophical role for thought experiments to help identify logically contingent,
though cognitively fundamental capacities and circumstances necessary to human thought, experi-
ence and knowledge. As Kant also noted, experiments are only informative in response to posing
the right question, indeed: the right kind of question (KdrV Bxii–xiv). Accordingly, preparations
for these epistemological thought experiments (§2) fill half of this chapter. The second half (§§3–
5), examines three such thought experiments, variously developed by Kant, Hegel, C. I. Lewis,
Austin, Wittgenstein and F. L. Will. (5.08.2016)
§1 INTRODUCTION.
Credible, informative epistemology has been difficult, even before Descartes’s Meditations ele-
vated it to first philosophy, not least because we must use most if not all of our cognitive capaci-
ties to consider and to specify the character, scope and limits of our cognitive capacities. Worse
yet, the problem of global perceptual scepticism appears as easy to formulate as it is difficult to
solve: simply as a matter of logic, all of our beliefs, thoughts and experiences could appear to us
to be just as they are, even if none were veridical (Stroud 1994). Since Gettier, Quine and David-
son, it may well appear that philosophers can only reply to sceptics by telling them to get lost,
Rorty (1986) suggested. Gettier’s (1963) famous counter-examples to analysing the concept
‘knowledge’ exhaustively into the concepts of ‘justification’, ‘truth’ and ‘belief’, all turn on con-
textual factors of which the benighted protagonist of his examples, Smith, is unaware, and of
which he could not become aware merely by reflecting upon his own attitudes, beliefs or experi-
ences. Varieties of epistemological externalism flourished in response. Quine (1969, 75) belittled
the ‘make believe’ involved in the empiricist attempt to reconstruct the world on the sole bases
of logic and one’s own (putative) sensory experiences, advising instead to naturalise epistemol-
ogy by embracing cognitive psychology. Davidson (1987 [2001, 154]) conceded to Rorty’s (1986)
suggestion.
Does epistemology collapse for lack of resources other than logic, conceptual analysis and
descriptions of one’s own apparent experiences, thoughts and beliefs? No, but understanding
how and why not requires, Kant noted, a ‘changed method of thinking’ (veränderte Methode der
Denkungsart; KdrV Bxvii, 704). Some of these methodological changes are summarised in §2 in
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order to identify a philosophical role for thought experiments to help identify logically contin-
gent, though cognitively fundamental capacities and circumstances necessary to human thought,
experience and knowledge. As Kant also noted, experiments are only informative in response to
posing the right question, indeed: the right kind of question (KdrV Bxii–xiv). Accordingly,
preparations for these epistemological thought experiments (§2) fill half of this chapter. The
second half (§§3–5), examines three such thought experiments, variously developed by Kant,
Hegel, C. I. Lewis, Austin, Wittgenstein and F. L. Will.
§2 SOME CRITICAL CAUTIONS & A ROLE FOR THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS.
To change one’s ‘method of thinking’ is not merely to exchange one philosophical method or
one set of assumptions for another. It involves changing one’s basic ways, means and strategies
of thinking, one’s whole approach to philosophising, and thereby to change one’s ways of using
or assessing any philosophical method, or its scope, limits and results. Accordingly, the following
remarks can only characterise some relevant changes and, I hope, make them plausible, though
not defend them in detail.1
§2.1 Conceivability, Infallibilism & Philosophical Cogency. Global perceptual scepticism is logically
possible. Is this logical possibility, conceivable as it is, epistemologically relevant? Why or how,
exactly? Deductive logic concerns avoiding various fallacies by which false conclusions would be
drawn from true premises. Although knowledge involves avoiding or minimising error so far as
possible, there is no good reason to think that, in addition to truth (or sufficient accuracy) and
belief, the justification condition(s) for knowledge can be specified or satisfied by deductive logic
alone – however one may analyse one’s concepts, beliefs or apparent experiences. Why suppose
that cognitive justification sufficient for knowledge must eliminate any and all logically possible,
merely conceivable alternative states of affairs – whether regarding the content of the belief or
claim, its origins, or whatever else may be thought to contribute to or to constitute its cognitive
justification? If one could exclude or eliminate any and all logically possible alternatives, that
would certainly suffice to guarantee the truth of the belief or claim in question, but why think
failure to exclude or eliminate all logically possible alternatives is required for knowledge, specifi-
cally: for cognitive justification?
Infallibilism about cognitive justification is most familiar from Descartes’ attempt to outwit
the possibility of a malignant, deceptive genie. Descartes’ attempt is vitiated, not by one, but five
distinct vicious circularities.2 The worst concerns the prospect that, not the Divinity, but rather
the malignant genie imbued Descartes with exactly the same innate ideas of simple natures as he
reports having, including his idea of the Divinity, but so arranges the rest of creation that none
of Descartes’ ideas (other than that of his own occurrent thinking being) are true – especially his
idea that any being with one perfection must have all perfections, because one divine perfection
is that, within the Divinity, all perfections are simply one and unitary.3 Descartes deliberately
wrote meditations rather than disputations, but co-meditating epistemologists who do not
receive the divine neo-Augustinian illumination to which Descartes purports to guide our atten-
1For detailed examination, see Westphal (2004), (2016a), (2016b).
2The five circularities are detailed in Westphal (1987–88). Subsequent defences of Descartes against charges
of circularity have neglected the complexities and difficulties confronting his epistemological project in
the Meditations.
3Meditations 3, 5; Replies 1/AT 7:49–50, 137, 240, 241; 8.1:12.
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tion, must instead develop a radically different approach to epistemology.
The classic empiricist alternative was to reduce all talk about physical objects and events to
talk about elementary sensory episodes and various logical (re)constructions of them. Though
often proposed, none came closer to achieving such a reduction or (re)construction than Carnap
(1928). The most fundamental problem confronting any such (re)reconstruction is that either the
(re)construction takes the temporality of the sequences we experience for granted, and so fails to
complete the proposed reduction or (re)construction; or else appeal to unreconstructed temporal
ordering is avoided, but then the reduction or (re)construction can only specify symmetrical
relations amongst elementary sensory episodes which in principle fail to formulate the asymmet-
rical temporal relations involved in anyone’s experiences, including those historical events inves-
tigated and explained by any empirical theory, including their procedures and processes of
observation and data collection – all of which are temporally extended processes. Empiricist
reductionism fails prior to posing issues about cognitive justification.
Infallibilist standards of cognitive justification would be wonderful, were they within our
capacities. ‘Infallibilism’ requires not only that strict logical deduction suffices, but also that it is
necessary for cognitive justification. Infallibilism equates cognitive justification with provability.
Provability constitutes justification, however, only within strictly formal domains. The one
strictly formal domain is a properly reconstructed Aristotelian square of opposition; only within
that domain are sentences provable (demonstrable) on the basis of form alone (Wolff 2009). All
other domains involve various existence postulates, including semantic postulates. The adequacy
and the use of these postulates cannot be assessed by formal methods alone. We can of course
formalise various domains or linguistic frameworks (Lewis 1929 [1956], 298; Carnap 1950a), but
within such formalised logistic systems, strict deduction can at most be necessary, though never
sufficient for the justification of specific claims within their domains. The justification of specific
claims always involves the further semantic or existence postulates constitutive of their domain,
and requires the assessment of the use of those postulates in connection with the specific claim
in question. This is no objection to formalised logistic systems; it is a fact. Problems for episte-
mology lie in failure to recognise this fact and its implications. One implication of this fact is that
infallibilist standards of justification are appropriate only to formal domains. Empirical knowl-
edge concerns spatio-temporal objects, events, persons, structures or processes. Accordingly,
empirical knowledge is a non-formal domain. Hence infallibilist standards are not ‘too stringent’,
as has been frequently claimed: Infallibilist standards of justification are in principle irrelevant to
empirical knowledge. As Kant noted, deductive logic is a canon for rational judgment, but
(outside strictly formal domains) no organon for knowledge (KdrV A52–4, 60–1, 795–7/B76–8,
85–6, 823–5).
An important corollary to this interim finding is that the prime methodological problem
confronting epistemology is to determine, within the domain of all logical possibilities, which
possibilities pertain to human cognition. An important feature of this vast perplexity is high-
lighted by considering the philosophical fate of Aristotle’s model of philosophical knowledge,
epistçmç or scientia, which he modelled on Euclidean geometry, but which he expressly insisted
must be matched to the precision possible within any domain of inquiry. How and why did this
flexible model become the strict deductivist infallibilism associated with scientia in the Modern
period? It was not Descartes’ innovation. It was legislated in March 1277 by Étienne Tempier,
Bishop of Paris, upon the authority of the Roman Pope, when he condemned as heretical 220
neo-Aristotelian theses in natural philosophy (Piché 1999). It is both explicit in Tempier’s con-
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demnation, and implied by many of his comments on those thesis, that the Divine Omnipotence
can do anything which is not logically self-contradictory, including bringing about any effect
without its typical causes. This holds, too, for those ‘effects’ we typically regard as our sensory
experiences of our surroundings. Knowledge – scientia – requires eliminating all logically possible
alternatives to any cognitive claim. All else is either divine revelation or fallible conjecture;
natural philosophers can do no more, and no better, than to propose possible explanations of
natural phenomena. That edict was later violated by Copernicus and Galileo, though honoured
by Descartes (at least officially).4 Tempier’s edict made mere logical conceivability into a main-
stay of philosophical analysis, argumentation and (dis-)proof (Boulter 2011), even if its implica-
tions for global perceptual scepticism were first explicitly generalised in Descartes’s Meditations.5
Infallibilism about cognitive justification limits epistemology to conceptual analysis, not only
because it proscribes appeal to logically contingent empirical premises (other than those pertain-
ing to first-person reports of appearances to oneself), but also because it requires reliable first-
person awareness of all justificatory factors relevant to any claim at issue: the view now called
‘access internalism’. This includes full, competent reliable access to the factors constitutive of
knowledge, so that one can determine whether these factors are, in any specific case, satisfied.
This is the strong ‘K-K’ principle: The purported requirement that, to know that x, one must
know that one knows that x. These considerations drove ‘traditional’ (pre-Gettier) epistemolo-
gists to seek a conceptual analysis of knowledge as consisting in justified true belief, as the
conceptually necessary, jointly sufficient conditions for any and all empirical knowledge.
The chief methodological problem confronting epistemology as conceptual analysis is the
Paradox of Analysis: How can any conceptual analysis be informative, and yet also be recognised
to be complete and adequate? If we can recognise a conceptual analysis to be complete and
adequate, we must already understand the concept(s) so analysed, in which case the analysis is
uninformative. If instead a conceptual analysis is informative, how can we tell whether it is
complete or adequate? This paradox of analysis greatly exercised philosophers from the 1940s
into the 1990s, though neglected since. This neglect is reflected, if unwittingly, in how easily
philosophers today offer or accept as serious challenges remarks of the form: ‘But couldn’t
someone say _____?’, or: ‘But couldn’t it be, couldn’t it happen that _______?’ Such questions
presume that any and all logically possible alternatives to any proposed account must be elimi-
nated in order to justify that proposal. Such philosophers have inherited their methodological
predilections from Bishop Tempier. Consider again Descartes’ statement that one perfection of
the Divinity is that within the Divinity all perfections are simply one and unitary (AT 7:137). So
saying does not suffice to conceive this purported truth; it is as much a contradiction as insisting
that within the numerical unit, 1, all numbers are simply one and unitary: Any plurality of perfec-
tions is inconsistent with their simple numerical unity. Saying or claiming otherwise does not
make it otherwise conceivable. Merely thinking that one is speaking or thinking cogently, however
sincerely one may so suppose, does not suffice actually to think or to speak cogently. Neither our
concepts, our meanings, nor the cogency of our own thinking or speaking are transparently self-
4Prin. 3.46, AT 8.1:100–1; Disc. Meth., AT 6:45–6; Le Monde, AT 11:36.
5Widely known to Mediaevalists, the Paris Condemnation of 1277 remains just as widely neglected even
by specialists in 17th Century philosophy, including those concerned with philosophical history; most
recently, e.g., Lærke et al (2013). Papal infallibility was only made official dogma by the First Vatican
Council (1870) in its ‘First dogmatic constitution on the Church of Christ’, chapt. 4, §9. It became the
majority Catholic view during the Reformation, i.e. a century after the Paris Condemnation; see Tierney
(1972).
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evident in the ways philosophers still too often and habitually suppose (cf. Burge 2010).
The best solutions to the Paradox of Analysis all, implicitly or explicitly, replace conceptual
analysis with conceptual explication (cf. esp. Hare 1960). It is striking and significant that both
Kant (KdrV A727–31/B755–9) and Carnap (1950b, 1–18) distinguish between conceptual
analysis and conceptual explication, in these very terms, and for very much the same reasons and
to the same effect. Conceptual explication does not aspire to completeness; conceptual explica-
tion is selective and aspires to improve the clarity of the explicated concept(s) and to improve
upon their use in the context(s) of original use of the concept(s) in question. No conceptual expli-
cation is known to be complete; all remain corrigible and partial; their assessment is always in
part a function of their improved function within possible contexts of their actual use, not within
merely imagined contexts of their (allegedly) possible use! Because they are context-bound in this
way, conceptual explications involve – and invoke – important aspects of semantic externalism,
the thesis that the content (intension) of a concept or term may be specified by factors unac-
knowledged by a competent speaker, S, and which may concern circumstances of which S/he
cannot become aware by simple reflection. Simply calling a philosophical account of a concept,
term, phrase or principle an ‘analysis’ does not suffice for that account to be a conceptual analy-
sis. If the content or adequacy of that account depends in part upon its context of actual use, it
is an explication. The first methodological maxim is to make such context-dependence into a
philosophical virtue. The questions are how to do so, and whether such virtues can aid episte-
mology.
Gettier’s (1963) counter-examples in effect echo Carnap’s distinction between conceptual
analysis and conceptual explication, insofar as Gettier’s counter-examples invite us, his readers,
to re-consider how we would use, understand and explicate the concepts ‘empirical knowledge’
and (cognitive) ‘justification’ in the kinds of circumstances of use in which Smith believes he
knows something which, in view of contextual factors unknown to him, he cannot know.
§2.2 Naturalised Epistemology & Causal Reliability ‘Theories’. Another way of stating the exorbitant
demands of infallibilism about cognitive justification is that it requires proving a priori that our
cognitive capacities suffice for empirical knowledge in any possible environment, before trusting
ourselves to know anything about our actual environment. These a priori, merely analytic aspira-
tions of ‘traditional’ (pre-Gettier) epistemology were discarded by ‘naturalised’ epistemology,
which appeals in various ways to various empirical findings in order to understand empirical
knowledge. One popular genre of naturalised epistemology takes the form of ‘causal reliabilism’.
The popularity of causal ‘theories’ of knowledge, of language or of human mindedness, unfortu-
nately, exceeds their cogency.
Davidson (1980, 80; 2004, 98) noted that we lack knowledge of relevant causal laws and
mechanisms in these domains. That is correct, significant, yet insufficient. Dretske’s information-
theoretic epistemology established three important semantic points:
1. Causal relations are neither necessary to nor sufficient for information relations. (Dretske 1981,
30–9)
2. Information relations are necessary for any specifically semantic content, and hence also for linguis-
tic meaning or conceptual content. (Dretske 1981, 214–30)
3. Information relations are necessary though not sufficient for representations or for relations of
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representation, whether sensory or conceptual. (Dretske 1981, 153–230; 19956)
These points stand, regardless of the (in)adequacy of Dretske’s account of the information
decoding required for belief or knowledge (Dretske 1981, 57, 144, 219),7 and regardless of the
shortcomings of his attempt to naturalise the mind. Dretske’s findings entail that bland appeals
to ‘causality’ in matters of human mindedness are, as Pinker (1997, ix) remarked about earlier
philosophical views of the mind, ‘too vapid to be wrong’.
If indeed we can know anything (such as how to see, recognise, read and understand these
printed words), it is in part because our psycho-physio-neurology functions in ways which enable
us to know something. The difficulty is to fill in this platitude with sufficient, informative specif-
ics. This, I believe, must be a multi-disciplinary task. The proper task can be formulated and
pursued only by heeding a major problem with its predecessor at the turn of the 20th Century
(C.E.): ‘psychologism’. Reviewing that multi-disciplinary (also polyglot, robustly international
and inter-continental) literature, as I recently did, underscores just how grave and pervasive were
problems of psychologism, and why it so exercised not only Frege, but still at mid-Century also
Carnap (1950b, §11). One chronic error of philosophers is simply to postulate whatever psycho-
logical or neurophysiological processes they think are required to fill in between the aspects of
human mindedness they describe philosophically; so doing is evident not only, e.g., in Brentano
(1874), Lipps (1901, 1912, 1913), or Wundt (1907), but also in Quine (1995).8 More significantly:
to pertain to knowledge or to epistemology, causal regularities or psycho-physiological processes
must be, or must satisfy, proper, that is: properly cognitive, functions. They must be properly re-
sponsive to truth, accuracy and in many cases to evidence and analysis. These parameters are
inherently normative, even though they are instantiated or effected by our socio-psychological
neurophysiology. The recent rise of ‘virtue epistemology’ in effect addresses a gap in epistemol-
ogy resulting from rejecting anything so psychological as judgment. Yet many beliefs don’t just
happen to happen; many (if not most or all) beliefs are formed, and they are formed more or less
responsibly – if often habitually so. Even Russell’s deliberately simple example, ‘The cat is on the
mat’, requires not just sensory experience, but noticing the cat, the mat, and their respective
locations. Seeing is not believing; believing is not simply seeing. Believing is propositionally
structured in ways that sensory perception alone is not (Dretske 1969, chapt. 2). In many cases,
beliefs result not merely from judgments, but as they should: from considered judgment (Elgin
1999).
§2.3 Conceptual Content, Linguistic Meaning & Specifically Cognitive Reference. A more fundamental
problem confronting currently popular causal ‘theories’ highlights both the distinctiveness of
epistemology and a long-standing methodological shortcoming of much analytic philosophy.
Causal theories of human mindedness (language, thought, belief, knowledge, action) describe
various intelligent capacities, actions or achievements in causal terms. Whether those causal
terms refer, and if so how accurately, to any instantiations within our neurophysiology, are
assumed by most so-called ‘causal’ theories; they are neither established nor investigated by
6This point is developed gradually in Dretske (1995); it concerns the relations between ‘natural’ and
‘functional’ meaning, and how representational systems must function in order to be capable of
misrepresentation.
7For concise discussion, see Westphal (2003), §§26, 27.
8On Quine, see Murphey (2012), Westphal (2015). Ignorance if not contempt of our predecessors has
reached such extremes that it is worth noting that Lipps’ translation of Hume’s Treatise is excellent, and
that much current philosophical ‘naturalism’ is no more cogent than that at the turn of the 20th Century
(C.E.); see Westphal (2016a), (2016b).
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causally-minded philosophers. Responsible naturalistic epistemologists rightly appeal to results
of relevant empirical sciences (e.g., Kornblith 2002; Millikan 2004; Ryder et al 2012); this is as it
should be. Cognitive reference to relevant, specific causal particulars and their kinds can be bor-
rowed in this way – though only from actual scientific results.
Too often neglected by causal theorists of human mindedness is a basic distinction between
(e.g.) uttering a sentence and making a claim. To be a claim, even a candidate cognitive claim, a
sentence must be used to make a statement about some relevant particulars (of whatever kind or
scale). The linguistic meaning or the conceptual content (intension) of any sentence or statement
in principle does not suffice to determine whether there are any such particulars, or whether
there are several, or only one such. However detailed or extensive a description may be (when
used to explicate the linguistic meaning or conceptual content of any proposition, sentence,
thought or statement), and regardless of whether it includes one or more putative definite refer-
ring expressions,9 intension cannot secure definite singular reference, because there may be no
such particular as satisfies that intension, or there may be several such. Predication as a linguistic
form does not suffice for predication as a proto-cognitive act of ascribing characteristics to any
one (or more) particular(s). Conversely, an intension may in part be inaccurate, and yet be used
successfully to designate some particular; this is part of Donnellan’s (1966) point about success-
ful referential use of inaccurate definite descriptions, such as ‘The man in the corner holding a
Martini’, which can pick out one person within a group clustered in the indicated corner, where
the others (let us suppose) evidently hold soft drinks, yet the designated individual in fact drinks
from his Martini glass only water.
The epistemological significance of the distinction between predication as a grammatical
(sentential) form and predication as a proto-cognitive achievement of ascribing a characteristic(s)
to some particular individual(s) is augmented by Evans’ (1975) account of predication. Evans
argued (soundly, I submit) that mastery of predicates within some language requires being able
to distinguish particulars or their specific aspects which are properly characterised by the predi-
cate(s) in question, where such discrimination involves identifying by delimiting the relevant
region occupied by the relevant particular(s) or their aspect(s). Evans showed that ascription of
any characteristic and spatio-temporal localisation by delimitation of any particular exhibiting
that characteristic are mutually interdependent proto-cognitive achievements.
Donnellan’s and Evans’ findings hold regardless of considerations about accuracy or preci-
sion; sufficient accuracy or precision to discriminate the relevant individual(s) and characteris-
tic(s) from other individuals and characteristics suffices, even if they are approximate. Their
points hold regardless of whether a single, particular individual or a plurality of particular indi-
viduals may be at issue; they hold regardless of the scale or duration of the relevant individual(s),
and they hold regardless of issues about any cognitive or doxastic justification of the relevant
attribution. Their findings are decisive for epistemology, for the following reasons.
To make even a candidate claim to know something empirically requires localising the rele-
vant particular(s) within space and time, and ascribing some characteristic to it (or to them).
Predication in the form of ascription of characteristic(s) to some particular individual(s) is neces-
sary for Someone’s claim to have any truth value, or any value as an approximation. Such attribu-
tion is also necessary to evaluate the truth or the accuracy of that attribution. Such attribution is
also necessary for S’s claim to have any cognitive justification, of whatever form(s) and to what-
ever extent it may be cognitively justified. And – waiving for now issues about error, false belief
9Such as, e.g.: ‘the’, ‘the one and only’, ‘the very one itself’, ‘those very ones there’ or ‘whoever just entered’.
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and radical mis-representation – S’s claim having some kind and extent of cognitive justification
is required to assess its cognitive justification, and whether it suffices for knowledge. (These
conditions must be satisfied by any other claims required to determine whether S’s attribution
errs or fails radically.)
Whatever may be the proper account of linguistic meaning or linguistic reference, and like-
wise whatever may be the proper account of conceptual content (intension), these do not suffice
for epistemology, because they do not suffice for specifically cognitive reference – even putative,
proto-cognitive reference – to localised, discriminated individuals. The ego-centric predicament
posed by global perceptual scepticism voids not only the justificatory resources required for any
empirical knowledge, it voids also the referential resources required to make even candidate
cognitive claims (within the non-formal domain of putative empirical knowledge). This point
holds regardless of theories of linguistic meaning or of conceptual content (intension); it con-
cerns proto-cognitive reference to particulars. I stress ‘proto-cognitive’, because such reference is
necessary for any empirical claim to know something; it is necessary for any claim even to be a
candidate cognitive claim; accuracy and sufficient cognitive justification are distinct, further
cognitive requirements. Consequently, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind may
contribute to epistemology, but they do not suffice for epistemology: accuracy of ascription and
specifically cognitive justification are not phenomena within the domains of philosophy of lan-
guage or philosophy of mind (whether singly or combined). Ultimately, this is why philosophers
of language such as Quine, Rorty or Davidson could only tell sceptics to get lost (above, §1).10
Thinking or supposing that one ascribes various characteristics to something does not suffice for
any actual ascription. Actual ascription, even putative ascription, requires localising the relevant
particular(s), sufficiently to discriminate them from their neighbours or relatives (i.e., from
similar, though relevantly different sorts of individuals).11
§2.4 Identifying & Exploiting our Cognitive Dependencies. The ego-centric predicament of global
perceptual scepticism purports to rob us of both our justificatory resources and of our referential
resources, required for even candidate empirical claims to know anything. Despite his infallibilist
aspirations, one feature of Descartes’ strategy in the Meditations merits credit: In various regards
Descartes seeks to characterise his manifold dependencies, including his cognitive dependencies,
and to exploit these for epistemological insight. (Descartes himself did not advocate the disem-
bodied mind invented by his successors; cf. Ferrini 2016.)
Here, at last, is a role for thought experiments in epistemology: Can thought experiments be
devised to help us identify some of our fundamental cognitive capacities, and our consequent
incapacities? Can thought experiments be devised to help us identify how some of our funda-
mental cognitive capacities are in principle and in practice dependent capacities, in ways which
illuminate epistemological issues, without simply dismissing issues about scepticism, or simply
replacing epistemology with empirical cognitive science? Can thought experiments contribute
philosophically to the multi-disciplinary research required to understand human cognition?
10Though Quine (1969) appeared to advocate naturalising epistemology, he never did. His referential ‘proxy
functions’ preserved no more than cardinality, but prescinded from any determinate ascription of
characteristics to localised particulars. Quine said that physical objects are only a simplifying posit, but his
own semantics precludes associating any specific or adequate concept(s) with his physical inscriptions or
utterances. Talk is cheap; actually saying something significant is more demanding; see Westphal (2015).
11I beg the reader’s forbearance if I appear to belabour the obvious, but recent literature provides all too
much evidence that these elementary points of epistemology and ascription (as distinct to mere
description) are widely neglected; e.g., the resurgence of ‘analytic metaphysics’ presupposes it.
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Three such thought experiments are considered below (§§3–5). They are thought experiments,
not merely examples, and they experiment with our human capacities for thought. They aim to
contribute to our self-knowledge as cognisant beings, by helping us to identify some very basic
features of our very finite form of human cognisance, and to appreciate their epistemological
implications. In this regard, these examples are not merely conceptual, and concern not merely
what is possible, but what is possible for us human beings.
Against Strawson’s (1966) analytical reconstruction of Kant’s ‘Objectivity Argument’, Rorty
observed:
Arguments of the Strawsonian type rest on considerations of which words can be understood
independently of which other words. The relevance of these considerations vanishes if we admit
the possibility of a being who could experience something as an X but could not use the word ‘X’
nor any equivalent expression. (Rorty 1970, 224; cf. 231)
Rorty’s observation epitomises the characteristically ‘analytical’ misunderstanding of Kant’s
transcendental methods and proofs, a misunderstanding running through the whole discussion
of ‘analytic transcendental’ arguments. Conceptual content or linguistic meaning as such cannot
suffice for epistemology (per §2.3). Rorty’s question, whether ‘a being who could experience
something as an X but could not use the word “X” nor any equivalent expression’ is possible,
itself belongs to the infalliblist tradition inaugurated by Bishop Tempier in 1277 (Boulter 2011),
skewered by Carnap (1950b) and Gettier (1963), though superceded by Kant in 1781 (Westphal
2007). Unless we are that kind of being whose possibility Rorty supposes, that possibility is
irrelevant to our human form of finite cognisance.
The prospects for epistemology are not significantly improved by seeking some form of
‘broad’ conceptual necessity; for that, too, we would need adequate criteria for adequate explica-
tion of ‘broad’ conceptual necessity, and adequate grounds for supposing that any such ‘broad’
conceptual necessity pertains to us as the finite cognisant beings we are. Not only metaphysics,
but too much epistemology has ‘merely groped around, and worst of all: amongst mere concepts’
(KdrV Bxv)!12 Like Kant, some exceptional ordinary language philosophers recognised that
epistemological issues cannot be addressed merely in terms of linguistic meaning, conceptual or
propositional content (intension) or other forms of conceptual analysis. Specifically epistemo-
logical issues are only engaged when we consider how we can form and use thoughts to make
putative cognitive claims or judgments, whether in specific cases or wholesale.
Consider one point Kant claims to establish in this way. He grants that it is entirely conceiv-
able that there be no space at all, and that we can conceive of space as being entirely empty, but
he denies we can represent to ourselves the absence or lack of space (KdrV A24/B38–9). Kant’s
point concerns the fundamental role within human cognisance of representing individuals and
events spatially, and how spatial representation is required for us to represent anything as distinct
to ourselves. He makes comparable points about how we experience all appearances temporally,
that is, within time (KdrV A31/B46). My present point is not to defend these claims, but to high-
light Kant’s concern with identifying our human forms of sensibility, which are (partly) constitu-
tive of our human form of mindedness, namely, that we experience whatever we do spatially and
12The pervasive error here illustrated from Rorty (1970) was not due to lack of good information; see
Watson (1881), Caird (1889), Bird (1966) and Dryer (1966). The error was made pervasive by philosophers’
willingness to heed Russell’s (1923; CP 9:39) battle-cry, ‘back to the 18th Century’, by which Russell had
meant Hume, not Kant. Such default empiricism persists today in much ‘analytic metaphysics’.
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temporally. (Nothing here turns on whether our experiences are veridical.) The logical possibility
of other forms of cognisance is altogether beside Kant’s elementary epistemological point.
We cannot expect an entire epistemology from a few thought experiments, but we can expect
some epistemologically significant results. In view of the manifold constraints on philosophical
theory of knowledge reviewed above, that is far from nothing. Here I cannot develop or defend
these results in detail; I hope however to make clear how to appreciate and assess these kinds of
thought experiments. I shall consider them in systematic rather than chronological order, begin-
ning with singular cognitive reference (above, §2.3).
§3 HEGEL ON THE SEMANTICS OF SINGULAR COGNITIVE REFERENCE.
Hegel’s phenomenological method involves establishing some positive conclusions through
strictly internal critique of the views and principles he opposes, considered in connection with
their intended domains of use. About Hegel’s method Robinson (1977, 2) observed that ‘... bad
theory makes for bad practice, and the bad practice shows up the logical difficulties of the the-
ory’. In The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), and in his subsequent systematic philosophy, Hegel
undertakes to revamp and augment Kant’s Critical account of rational judgment and justifica-
tion, whilst dispensing with Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (and other such views). These aims,
together with Hegel’s methodological strictures – especially:  to avoid petitio principii – require
Hegel (inter alia) to argue against aconceptual ‘knowledge by acquaintance’. This he does in the
first chapter of the Phenomenology, by using thought experiments concerning commonsense cogni-
tive claims, to elicit our recognition of fundamental and pervasive roles of various concepts and
our competent use of them within even the apparently ‘simplest’ claims to know anything. The
form of consciousness Hegel calls ‘sense certainty’ espouses naïve realism. Hegel’s phenom-
enological presentation of this paradigmatic naïve realist highlights varieties of ‘mediation’
involved in what sense certainty purports is utterly immediate knowledge. Many of the ‘medita-
tions’ revealed by Hegel’s examples are conceptual and cognitive, involving the competent use of
various concepts.13
Anticipating by a century Russell’s early view that ‘this’ is a logically proper name, Hegel
queries:
Thus sense certainty itself is to be asked: What is the this? If we take it in the doubled form of its
being, as the now and as the here, the dialectic which it has within itself will receive just as compre-
hensible a form as the this itself is. To the question, What is the now? we thus answer for example:
The now is night. A simple experiment suffices to test the truth of this sense certainty. We write this
truth down; a truth can lose nothing through writing it down, just as little as by preserving it. If we
look now, this noon, again at this written truth, we must say that it has become stale.
The now, which is night, is preserved, that is, it is treated as what it was given out to be, as a
being; but it proves itself much more to be a non-being. Of course the now itself sustains itself, but
as a something that is not night; and it sustains itself just as well against day, which it now is, as
something that also is not day, .... This self-preserving now is thus not something immediate, but
instead something mediated, for it is determined as something remaining and self-preserving
13A critical synopsis of Hegel’s method and critique of naïve realism is provided by Westphal (2009); for
a full-dress examination and assessment, see Westphal (2000), (2002–03); for the bearing of Hegel’s
critique on Russell, see Westphal (2010b). Translations are my own. Quotations are brief to curtail the
scholarly digressions fuller quotation would require.
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through the fact that another is not, namely the day and the night. Nevertheless it is still as simple
as before, now, and in this simplicity it is indifferent to that which occurs in it .... (PhdG 9:64.29–
65.11/¶¶95–6)
Hegel’s example and discussion may appear either quaint or confused, but he is a master of
taking views absolutely literally and identifying what follows from them, and what does not, and
using these findings to identify further assumptions which allow that view to have appeared
plausible or tenable. Yes, Hegel does not here distinguish between the ‘is’ of predication, the ‘is’
of being and the ‘is’ of identity – but he is arguing against a view which rejects any and all con-
ceptual distinctions as unnecessary for simple, ‘immediate’ commonsense knowledge of any-
thing. Yes, of course we know how to, and we do, sort out and sequence our experiences of
various particulars, and our experiential episodes – but not simply by sensing whatever transpires
around us! Seeing that it is now night, or day, or dusk or dawn is a conceptually mediated, propo-
sitionally structured cognitive achievement, however commonsensical, automatic or apparently
‘immediate’ it may appear.
Some philosophers have responded (in discussion) to such examples by reporting that they
are unaware of using concepts in making any such claims or observations. Perhaps they are
unaware of using concepts, but such lack of awareness proves nothing without the further
premiss of strong Cartesian self-transparency. Descartes deceived himself about how self-trans-
parent were his own clear and distinct ideas (Westphal 2014, §4.1); so too naïve realists. Here we
begin to appreciate the point and character of Kant’s transcendental inquiries, which Hegel
further developed: to try to identify basic capacities we must exercise in order to be sufficiently
self-aware as to wonder (e.g.) about the scope and character of human cognisance. Like Kant’s,
Hegel’s cognitive psychology accords well with much recent cognitive science (Brook 1994;
deVries 1988). As for distinguishing the ‘is’ of identity and the ‘is’ of predication, in ‘Sense Cer-
tainty’ Hegel justifies this distinction by reductio ad absurdum of aconceptual naïve realism, which
disregards their distinction.
This point comes to a head when sense certainty retrenches to an alleged specious present
awareness of any one particular (PhdG 9:67.23–32/¶105). Hegel continues his pursuit:
The now is pointed out, this now. Now; it has already ceased to be as it is pointed out. The now that
is, is an other than the one pointed out, and we see, that the now is just this: insofar as it is, already
no longer to be. The now, as it is pointed out to us, is something that has been, and this is its truth;
it doesn’t have the truth of being. It is therefore of course true that it has been. However what has
been, is in fact no being; it IS not, and the concern was with being.
We thus see in this pointing out only a movement taking the following course: 1) I point out
the now; it is maintained as the true. But I point it out as passing, or as something sublated. Thus
I sublate the first truth and 2) now I maintain as the second truth, that it has been, or is sublated. 3)
But what has been is not. I sublate the second truth, its having been or its being sublated. Thus I
negate the negation of the now, and thus return to what was first maintained: that now is. The now
and the pointing out of the now are thus so constituted, that neither the now, nor the pointing out
of the now, is an immediate simple; instead, each is a movement which contains distinct moments
within itself; .... But this first, which is reflected in itself, is not exactly the same as what it first
was, namely, something immediate. Instead, it is just something reflected within itself, or a simple which
remains what it is in other-being; a now that is absolutely many nows. And this is truthfully the
now; the now as a simple day that has many nows within it, hours; such a now, an hour, is just so
many minutes, and this now similarly is many nows and so on. – Pointing out is thus itself the
movement which pronounces what the now is in truth, namely a result, or a plurality of nows
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taken together; and pointing is the experience, that now is a universal. (PhdG 9:67.33–68.21)
If Hegel’s points are now obvious to us demonstrative sophisticates, that does not make them
insignificant. Hegel points out that any specific use of the concept ‘time’ involves specifying in
context some relevant period of time; in adjoining paragraphs he makes the parallel points about
using the concept ‘space’, ‘region of space’ and the personal pronouns (first-, second- or third-
person), and how specifying (sufficiently, if approximately) the relevant scope of what is ‘here’
and ‘now’ – and S/he to whom it is so – is required in order to designate any specific individual
as this particular here and now – or that one there and then, or witnessed by you or by her when-
and wherever it was located and localised by Someone in particular. Our use of none of these
concepts or terms is pointilistic, as it were; all of them are determinable concepts; their relevant
scope and reference must – and can only be – be fixed in situ. Using these determinable concepts
in such determinate ways, specifying their scope in context, is necessary for forming even the
most ordinary commonsense knowledge, including any seeing that ____ such and so is the case.
In the final two paragraphs Hegel makes the further point, like Evans, that fixing in situ the
relevant scope and reference of whatever in particular one claims to know about, requires not
just descriptive intension, but ascriptive attribution to specific, localised individuals (or their as-
pects) which we (putatively) delimit within space and time. Hegel expressly notes – like Kant,
and against Leibniz – that however extensive or detailed a description may be, it may equally
well describe several individuals, none at all, or perhaps (by dumb contingent luck) only one:
which case obtains is neither specified nor settled by that description (intension, classification),
but instead by localising some putative individual(s) to which one ascribes some characteristics
(PhdG 9:70.20–29/¶110).
In this way, Hegel argues by using these and related thought experiments to identify and
facilitate our appreciation of logically contingent, though fundamental and pervasive features of
our cognitive capacities, competences and achievements. Taken together, Hegel’s examples con-
stitute a reductio ad absurdum of naïve realism, which justifies the Thesis of Singular Cognitive
Reference (above §2.3). This decisive, incisive thesis is Kant’s, though he left to his readers to
find in the joint implications of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Amphiboly of the Con-
cepts of Reflection.14
Hegel’s initial characterisation of a ‘universal’ (concept) matches exactly that introduced by
Hume in his account of distinctions of reason (T 1.1.7.17–18), which marks the downfall of
concept empiricism: Hume’s official ‘copy theory’ of sensory impressions and ideas, together
with this three official ‘laws’ of psychological association, can at most account for classifications
of sensed characteristics, as fine- or coarse-grained as one can perceptually discriminate. How-
ever, to account for merely determinable concepts, such as ‘time’, ‘period of time’, ‘space’, ‘re-
gion of space’, ‘I’, ‘physical object’ (‘body’) or ‘word’, Hume can only appeal to our ‘imagination’,
but for these capacities of the imagination Hume can offer no empiricist account (Westphal 2013).
Finally, the Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference (§2.3) can be seen to undergird O. K.
Bouwsma’s (1949) brilliant exposé and critique of Cartesian scepticism. The general corollary to
that Thesis is this: Global sceptical ‘hypotheses’ are hypotheses in name only, because they lack
any determinate, specifiable reference to any particulars alleged to be responsible for blocking the
14It was brought to my attention by Melnick (1989); I develop it in Westphal (2004), very much in accord
with Bird (2006).
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veridicality (or the justification) of any and all sensory experience. They must prescind from any
such reference, in order to evade empirical investigation (and self-refutation). By evading refer-
ence in these ways, they fail to be even candidate cognitive claims; they are mere logical possibili-
ties, with no assessable truth-value, accuracy or cognitive justification. In all three regards they
lack cognitive standing, and so cannot serve to defeat or to undermine the cognitive justification
of any claim with cognitive status, even as putative knowledge (ascriptive attribution to some
localised individuals), however approximate or weakly justified it may be. Both Kant and Hegel
recognised that fallibilism about cognitive justification is no sceptical capitulation.
§4 KANT ON THE ‘TRANSCENDENTAL AFFINITY’ OF THE SENSORY MANIFOLD.
Taunting Leibniz, Hume (En 5.21) notes that his view of human concept- and belief-formation
through customary habituation affords, as it were, a pre-established harmony between the order
of nature and the order of thought. Hume is right about our cognitive dependence upon percep-
tible natural regularities, though his empiricism precludes its full appreciation. Kant noted that,
although all human knowledge begins with experience, it does not for that reason all result from
experience (KdrV B1). For all the sophistication of Kant’s account of the a priori concepts,
principles, structures and functions of the human mind, he insisted that our cognitive capacities
only become active in response to sensory stimulation from without the mind. Though neces-
sary, sensory stimulation as such is insufficient: it must be such that we can process it, by bring-
ing it under concepts in judgments whereby we classify and identify (at least putatively) various
particular objects, events or persons surrounding us. This basic point holds, mutatis mutandis,
Kant argues, regarding the contents of sensations, of empirical intuitions, of experiences and of
the objects we experience.
Kant’s thesis is that unless the contents of one’s sensations have a minimum, humanly recog-
nisable degree of regularity and variety they would not admit of perceptual synthesis, and so
would provide no basis for even putative cognitive judgments using either a priori or empirical
concepts. This ‘affinity’ (associability) of the sensory manifold is transcendental because a priori
it is a necessary condition of possible self-conscious human experience. It is formal because it
concerns the orderliness of the contents of sensations. However, ultimately it is satisfied neither
by the a priori intuitive conditions of experience (spatiality and temporality as forms of our
sensory receptivity) nor by the a priori conceptual conditions of cognitive judgment. Its satisfac-
tion is due to the ‘content’ or the ‘object’ of experience (KdrV, A112–3, A653–4/B681–2).
Appearances must be associable in order for us to make cognitive judgments at all. This
associability, Kant argues, must have an objective, necessary ground in order for experience to
be at all possible for us. This ground Kant calls the ‘affinity’ of the sensory manifold; he argues
for it using a wildly counterfactual thought experiment:
Now if this unity of association did not also have an objective ground, ... it would be entirely
accidental that appearances should fit into a connection in human knowledge. For even though we
should have the capacity to associate perceptions, it would remain entirely undetermined and
accidental whether they themselves were associable; and in case they were not associable, then a multitude
of perceptions, and indeed an entire sensibility would be possible, in which much empirical [sensa-
tion] would occur within my mind, but separated, and without belonging to one consciousness of
myself, which, however, is impossible. For only because I ascribe all perceptions to one conscious-
ness (original apperception) can I say of all perceptions that I am conscious of them. There must,
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therefore, be an objective ground ... upon which rests the possibility, indeed, the necessity, of a
law that extends to all appearances – a ground, namely, for regarding all appearances as data of the
senses that must be associable in themselves and subject to universal rules of a thoroughgoing
connection in their reproduction. This objective ground of all association of appearances I entitle their affinity.
... According to this principle all appearances, without exception, must so enter the mind or be
apprehended, that they conform to the unity of apperception. Without synthetic unity in their
connection, which is thus objectively necessary, this would be impossible .ÿ (KdrV, A121–3;
emphases added)
In this passage Kant points out that an intact and complete human sensibility and understanding,
capable of associating perceptions, does not of itself determine whether any appearances or
perceptions it has are in fact associable. If they weren’t, there may be fleeting, random sensa-
tions, but there could be no unified, and hence no self-conscious, experience. The necessity of
the associability of the sensory manifold is conditional; it holds between that manifold and any
self-conscious human being. Necessarily, if a human being is self-consciously aware of anything
via any sensory manifold (any plurality of sensations), then the content of that manifold is
associable. The associability of this content is its ‘affinity’. The fact that affinity is necessary for
possible self-conscious human experience entails that this affinity is transcendental.
Kant stresses the transcendental status of this issue in the following passage, though here he
speaks of a ‘logical law of genera’ instead of the ‘transcendental affinity’ of the sensory manifold:
If among the appearances offering themselves to us there were such a great a variety ... of content
[sic], i.e., regarding the manifoldness of existing beings – that even the most acute human under-
standing, through comparison of one with another, could not detect the least similarity (a case
which can at least be thought), then the logical law of genera would not obtain at all, no concept
of a genus, nor any other universal concept, indeed no understanding at all would obtain, since the
understanding has to do with such concepts. The logical principle of genera therefore presupposes
a transcendental [principle of genera] if it is to be applied to nature (by which I here understand
only objects that are given to us). According to that [latter] principle, sameness of kind is necessar-
ily presupposed in the manifold of a possible experience (even though we cannot determine its
degree a priori), because without it no empirical concepts and hence no experience would be possible. (KdrV,
A653–4/B681–2; emphases added.)
Despite Kant’s shift in terminology, the minimum condition which satisfies the ‘logical law of
genera’ likewise satisfies the ‘transcendental affinity’ of the sensory manifold: Below a certain (a
priori indeterminable) degree of regularity and variety amongst the contents of sensations, our
understanding cannot make judgments; consequently under that condition we cannot be self-
conscious (because we cannot identify ourselves as being self-consciously aware of anything else).
Consequently, this condition is a necessary, transcendental condition for the possibility of self-
conscious experience. Above this minimal level of regularity and variety, there is then a reflective
issue about the extent to which we can systematise (integrate) our experience of the world.
Insofar as we must use concepts to see that anything is or is not the case, we can only do so
within a world exhibiting humanly identifiable kinds of variety and repeatability amongst the
particulars we experience.15
Kant’s example of what we may call ‘transcendental chaos’: sensory contents so irregular we
could not detect any regularities or varieties amongst them – provides a thought experiment
15I discuss Kant’s examples and also Wittgenstein’s (in §5) in greater detail in Westphal (2005).
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which strongly supports the view now called mental content externalism. Kant expressly grants
that transcendental chaos is logically possible; his transcendental point is that such chaos cannot
hold of any world (of any environment) of which we human beings can be aware, nor within
which we can be aware of ourselves as being aware of some appearances occurring before,
during or after others. (Kant’s link between these forms of awareness cannot be examined here;
see Westphal 2016b.) If Kant’s thought experiment about transcendental chaos is correct, it
provides sufficient ground to block the sceptical generalisation from occasional possibility of
perceptual error or misjudgment to the alleged possibility of universally nonveridical sensory
‘experience’. The point of Kant’s thought experiment lies neither in the question whether a
world of sensory chaos is logically possible, nor in the question whether an unfortunate human
being might possibly be flooded with incomprehensibly chaotic sensations. The reflexive, tran-
scendental character of Kant’s thought experiment lies in the question, whether you, dear reader,
could be self-aware within a world in which your sensibility were flooded only by incomprehen-
sibly chaotic sensations?
Kant’s thought experiment may not be decisive, but it is bolstered by his analysis of the kinds
of conceptual, judgmental achievements required to integrate sensations into percepts, and
percepts into perceptual episodes, and those required to use the first-person pronoun. Those
analyses do not rely on thought experiments, but rather upon considerations of what is necessary
for us to process and integrate sensory information over time.16 It is worth noting here, however,
that Hegel’s thought experiments contra naïve realism (§4) and Kant’s thought experiment regard-
ing transcendental chaos nicely complement each other. This holds too of the third thought
experiment, from Wittgenstein (§5).
Kant himself did not work out the full implications of his transcendental thought experiment
about sensory chaos, for a reason later noticed and exploited by C. I. Lewis (1929). Fully devel-
oped, Kant’s thought experiment can replace much of the ‘Transcendental Deduction of the
Pure Categories of the Understanding’, and it refutes Kant’s Transcendental Idealism – support-
ing instead Lewis’s robust pragmatic realism, including his pragmatic conception of the relativ-
ised a priori (Westphal 2010, §2).
§5 WITTGENSTEIN ON THOUGHT & PERVASIVE REGULARITIES OF NATURE.
The thought experiments considered in this chapter comport with this aim of Wittgenstein’s:
Not empiricism and yet realism in philosophy, that is the hardest thing. (Wittgenstein, RFM VI,
§23; p. 325)
In a note to the Investigations, Wittgenstein observes:
What we have to mention in order to explain [zur Erklärung] the significance, I mean the impor-
tance, of a concept, are often extremely general facts of nature. Such facts as are hardly ever
mentioned because of their great generality. (PI §142 Note)
Wittgenstein sternly advised caution whenever a philosopher starts talking about how things
16See Guyer (1989), Strawson (1989); on Kant’s identification of our basic logical forms of judgment see
Wolff (2016), (forthcoming).
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must be.17 Yet caution about how things ‘must’ be is consistent with pointing out how things
must be, under specified conditions. For example, Wittgenstein showed forcefully that we can
use language and can follow rules only within and due to our relatively stable and identifiable
social and worldly context (Savigny 1991; Schroeder 2001; Travis 2006; Wright 1986).
To highlight the character and significance of ‘extremely general facts of nature’ Wittgenstein
develops and suggests some very radical, probing thought experiments. One such experiment
begins with a chair which disappears, or at least seems to occasionally, though at other times we
can touch it (PI §80). Occasions such as these are perplexing, but Wittgenstein underscores their
significance by radicalising the suggested instabilities of our surroundings:
Only in normal cases is the use of a word clearly prescribed to us; we know, have no doubt, what
to say in this or that case. The more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we
now are to say here. And if things behaved quite differently from how they actually behave – if
there were for instance no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became excep-
tion and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency – this would
make our normal language games lose their point [Witz]. – The procedure of putting a lump of
cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently
happened that such lumps grew or shrank for no obvious reason. (PI §142)
Wittgenstein draws attention to how our language is governed in ways that suit the nature we
know and live in. His considerations highlight a crucial conditional necessity, that to have any
point or any use at all, the structure of our language must broadly comport with the structure of
the world we inhabit (PI II §xii).
Wittgenstein invites us to imagine these wildly counterfactual circumstances:
If a ruler expanded to an extraordinary extent when slightly heated, we would say – in normal
circumstances – that that made it unusable. But we could think of a situation in which this was just
what was wanted. I am imagining that we perceive the expansion with the naked eye; and that we
ascribe the same numerical measure of length to bodies in rooms of different temperatures, if they
measure the same by the ruler which to the eye is now longer, now shorter.
It can thus be said: What is here called ‘measuring’ and ‘length’ and ‘equal length’, is something
different from what we call those things. The use of these words is different from ours; it is akin
to it; and we too use these words in a variety of ways. (RFM I §5; cf. §140)
Wittgenstein’s example is expressly enthymematic. The situation in which the rapidly expanding
ruler is ‘just what was wanted’ is one in which there are, not just rooms of various temperatures,
but also many other objects which expand readily (and very nearly at the same rate) with changes
in temperatures, just like the ruler. Such a regularity would give sense to the imagined, non-
standard practice of measuring. This imagined non-standard measuring practice underscores
ways in which our standard measuring practices are rooted not only in arithmetic but also in very
general regularities of nature: most particulars we ordinarily deal with do not expand dramatically
with small changes in temperature. Wittgenstein’s examples also underscore the importance of
the scientific practice of specifying critical quantities like density by reference to standard tem-
perature and pressure.
Wittgenstein’s thought experiments invite us to reflect on cases where ‘things behave quite
17 Cf. PI §§81, 101, 131; RFM II §41, III §§30 ¶2, 31 ¶1, VI §§7, 8, 24, 46, VII §67.
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differently from how they actually behave, ... if rule became exception and exception rule’ (PI I
§142). This suggests a massive inversion of typical regularities, by which the common rule would
become the isolated instance whilst normally bizarre cases would become ubiquitous. Consider
a world in which things in our environment did not conserve their quantities, either of volume,
or weight or number; imagine that they melded together like drops of liquid or bits of soft
dough, but without preserving mass, volume or shape in any noticeable way. If such non-con-
serving goo congealed or parted relatively slowly, perhaps we might be able to track some por-
tions of it. If instead their behaviour were quite rapid, we could not track them. If this were our
environment, we could not identify these items (even if there were ‘items’), we could not count
them, and we could not develop or use arithmetical concepts.
The transcendental character of Wittgenstein’s examples are plainest in On Certainty.18 Witt-
genstein again stresses the role of identifiable, stable natural regularities for the very point of our
language games (OC §513, cf. §505); without such regularities truth and falsehood would be
impossible (OC §514). This is one of Wittgenstein’s ‘fundamental’ statements, statements that are
neither logical truths nor results of empirical investigation (OC §§110, 138, 402, 494, 512); i.e.,
they defy Hume’s fork. Nevertheless, they form the stable basis, rooted in practice (OC §§7, 29,
110, 139, 402), without which we simply could not think (OC §§403, 506), hence not even about
ourselves. Wittgenstein’s reflections are genuinely transcendental because that they concern the
contingent, conditional necessities which must be satisfied if self-conscious human thought or
experience is to be at all possible for us.
Inspired by Wittgenstein, Waismann (1945) detailed the ‘porosity’ or ‘open texture’ of all
empirical concepts, which precludes any conclusive (empiricist) verification of any empirical
claim. Likewise our empirical classifications of individuals, their features and their kinds remain
in principle and in practice corrigible. Waismann’s points are important scores against infallibilist
presumptions about cognitive justification. Similarly inspired, and likewise critical of infallibilist
presumptions about cognitive justification, Austin (1946) suggested we consider this radical
thought experiment:
“Being sure it’s real” is no more proof against miracles or outrages of nature than anything else is
or, sub specie humanitatis, can be. If we have made sure it’s a goldfinch, and a real goldfinch, and
then in the future it does something outrageous (explodes, quotes Mrs. Woolf, or what not), we
don’t say we were wrong to say it was a goldfinch, we don’t know what to say. Words literally fail
us .... (Austin 1946, 160; 1979, 86)
Austin is right that infallibility is humanly impossible, certainly within the domain of empirical
knowledge. That is important, yet insufficient. Reflecting on these examples and on Wittgen-
stein’s, Frederick Will (1968) observed that not merely words fails us in such bizarre cases:
thought itself fails us. We very finite, semi-rational human beings can only think insofar as we
inhabit a tolerably comprehensible, negotiable, sufficiently describable, identifiable world.
§6 CONCLUSIONS.
Global perceptual scepticism presumes we have far greater capacities for intelligent thought,
speech and ‘experience’ than we do. That can be shown by transcendental use of these sorts of
18 My remarks on On Certainty are indebted to notes on this topic kindly shared with me by Graham Bird.
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thought experiments, provided philosophers recognise that the tasks of epistemology too – as
Kant recognised (KdrV A805/B833) – are comprehended within Thales’ commandment, in-
scribed at Delphi: ‘Know thyself!’ Rescinding infallibilism and mere conceptual analysis, and
recognising our manifold if indirect and often implicit dependence upon our environs, both
natural and social, are the beginnings of epistemological insight, which can be fostered and
informed by transcendental use of epistemological thought experiments, though only if we
change fundamentally our philosophical ‘method of thinking’.
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